The South China Sea: A new era of International Conflict
Editorial written for The International Relations Review
When Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced in 2010 that the U.S. had a “national interest” in the South China Sea and would extend assistance in facilitating talks between the conflicting nations, she received a dismissive response from the Chinese. “Regarding the role of the United States in this, the United States is not a claimant state to the dispute,” said Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai. “So it is better for the United States to leave the dispute to be sorted out between the claimant states.”
The South China Sea has long been a disputed area, with six nations voicing territorial claims over the oil- rich Paracel and Spratly Islands. China, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia stake claim to all or part of this sea, which has some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. The South China Sea extends from the Straits of Malacca to the Straits of Taiwan, and sees passage of 50 percent of all oil shipped worldwide as well as 50 percent of goods shipped by merchant ships. It is a crucial link between the Indian and Pacific oceans, and thus is crucial to the global economy and the balance of naval power in the region.
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Conflicting claims stem from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mandated 200 Nautical Mile limit from a coastal state’s baseline, establishing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a country, and the historical claims of states like China and Taiwan, who claim that their territory and national economy have for hundreds of years included these islands in the South China Sea. Truly, the argument is between who owns what resources, as the EEZ grants rights to the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. Thirty percent of the world’s fishing, oil, and coral reefs resources, which are located in this area, are in question with these intersecting territorial lines.
In April of this year, Russia and China conducted joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, involving drills for anti- submarine and rescue of hijacked vessel operations. Considering the tensions between China and the other conflicting states in the region, this display of naval operations in the Sea just north of the disputed area signals China’s military might in the region. It also indicates a shift in bilateral relations between Russia and China, which have “oscillated between friend and foe” over the past century.
In the week before Russia and China’s joint tests, the U.S. and the Philippines conducted even more inflammatory naval drills, including a mock beach invasion of China’s east coast. These exercises followed a standoff between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal, during which a Chinese fishing vessel entered disputed waters. The Chinese Navy blocked a Philippine warship from approaching the fishing boat, and the Chinese boat was allowed to keep its catch despite being caught illegally.
Since China began its rise to great power status, U.S.-China relations have avoided the instability and rivalry that defined U.S.-Soviet competition. However, China has begun constructing an aircraft carrier, a warship that defines naval power projection in this century. It is as if China is now pursuing a Mahanian policy of seapower, in which a state gains great power status through the development of an equally strong and powerful navy. However, the Chinese White Paper creates a deviation from the Mahanian seapower theory, as it defines the country’s naval policy to be one that “develops itself through upholding world peace, never engaging in aggression or expansion, and pursuing a defence policy which is defensive in nature.” The development of China’s navy can at best be described as two faced: on one side China is engaging in aggression by performing demonstrations in conflicted areas, yet on the other side China is pursuing a peaceful defence policy excluding aggression.
Experts predict that the South China Sea will be the next arena for global conflict. The region is exemplary of the era of global conflicts defined as “resource wars,” a term coined by Michael T. Klare. At the core of the conflict is the competition for resources and advantageous economic positions. This competition fuels the military actions and naval arms race in the region. However, what is different in this conflict than others disputes elsewhere is culture. The “Asian Way,” a cultural phenomenon which preaches respect for diversity, consensus building, pragmatism, and economic gradualism could be the key to a peaceful solution. This culture that fosters cooperation perhaps is the reason why the region has not burst into armed conflict. To understand this new era of international conflicts, the interventionist and alliance policies of surrounding powers, such as American relations with Taiwan and the Philippines, and Russian relations with China must be observed.
Aside from the nations that are taking part in the area, the institution that is most involved in resolving the issue is UNCLOS. Since the US has not signed UNCLOS, it is only an observer to any maritime dispute that UNCLOS undertakes, including this one. The “Asian Way” should take its course in the South China Sea with the United States and other outside powers left on the sidelines.